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The "Pessimists" and the "Optimists" disagree whether the US external deficits and the 
associated buildup of US net foreign liabilities are problems that require urgent attention. A 
warning signal should be that the debt ratio deviates significantly from the optimal ratio. The 
optimal debt ratio or debt burden should take into account the vulnerability of consumption to 
shocks from the productivity of capital, the interest rate and exchange rate. The optimal debt 
ratio is derived from inter-temporal optimization using Dynamic Programming, because the 
shocks are unpredictable, and it is essential to have a feedback control mechanism. The 
optimal ratio depends upon the risk adjusted net return and risk aversion both at home and 
abroad. On the basis of alternative estimates, we conclude that the Pessimists' fears are 
justified on the basis of trends. The trend of the actual debt ratio is higher than that of the 
optimal ratio. The Optimists are correct that the current debt ratio is not a menace, because the 
current level of the debt ratio is not above the corresponding level of the optimum ratio. 
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1. Pessimists and Optimists 
For nearly a quarter of a century, the US has persistently run significant current 
account deficits.  The cumulative consequence of these deficits is that the US has been 
transformed from the world's largest net creditor to its largest debtor.  The current account 
can be viewed in several ways.  It is net foreign investment, equal to national saving less 
investment.  A positive (negative) current account is equal to a capital outflow (inflow).  
National saving is the sum of private saving of firms and households plus government 
saving (the budget surplus).  Figure 1 graphs the current account/GDP of the United 
States, equal to net foreign investment/GDP and labeled NETFIGDP.  The sample period 
is 1977q1 - 2004q2.  Paradoxically, during the period 1996-2004 capital inflows to the US 
have been associated with capital outflows from Japan and the "developing countries"
1.   
The current account is defined as the sum of the trade balance of goods and 
services plus net investment income from US assets held abroad less foreign assets 
invested in the US.  The trade balance/GDP is graphed in figure 1 as BOPBGSGDP.  
Figure 1 shows that the current account is almost entirely dominated by the trade balance
2.  
The trade balance has been in deficit over the sample period, and has widened steadily and 
significantly.  Thereby the US became a debtor country. However, the balance on 
investment income is a negligible fraction of the current account, despite the growth in the 
external debt.  At present, there is no evidence of an external debt burden. 
                                                 
1 Bernanke (2005, table 1). 
2 The data used in this paper come from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis FRED.  J.L. Stein, US Current Account Deficits: A Stochastic Optimal Control Analysis  3
 
Figure 1.  Balance of payments goods and services/GDP (BOPBGSGDP) and current 














Figure 1. Balance of goods and services/GDP = BOPGSGDP; Current 
account/GDP = Net foreign investment/GDP = NETFIGDP; sample period is 1977q1 - 
2004q2.  The balance of investment income/GDP is the difference between the two 
curves.  The data are from Federal Reserve Bank of Saint Louis, FRED. 
 
The situation graphed in figure 1 has led Ben Bernanke
3 to pose several questions.  
(B1) Why has capital rich US been borrowing heavily, rather than lending on the 
international capital markets, from the capital poorer countries?  (B2) What implications 
do the US current account deficits and associated debt have for the performance of the US 
and world economies?  (B3) From a global perspective, are these developments 
economically beneficial or harmful in the long run as well as in the shorter run?  (B4) 
Based upon the answers to these questions, what are theoretically based Early Warning 
Signals of an impending crisis?   
                                                 
3 Bernanke, op. cit.  J.L. Stein, US Current Account Deficits: A Stochastic Optimal Control Analysis  4
In view of the level and trend of the current account and trade deficits in figure 1, 
the apprehensions have been repeated and reemphasized by many economists.  Refer to 
them as the Pessimists.  At one extreme is the group that claims that the continued current 
account deficits and growth of the debt portend a collapse of the dollar.  They do not 
clearly specify if the menace is the current account deficit/GDP or the debt/GDP ratio, and 
have not provided any early warning signals that involve both a number and a date.  
Figure 2 graphs the US current account/GDP, as a four-quarter moving average to smooth 
the data, alongside the real trade adjusted value of the US dollar REALTWD, relative to 
the major currencies.  Both variables are normalized for comparison.  A rise is an 
appreciation of the dollar.  The deficit has been large and growing since 1991.  By the 
fourth quarter of 2004, the deficit was 6.2 per cent of GDP.  There has been no downward 
trend in the real value of the US dollar, and certainly no collapse despite the growing 
current account and trade deficits since 1991.  The predictions of the extreme pessimists 
were not based upon a consistent and empirically verified theory.  J.L. Stein, US Current Account Deficits: A Stochastic Optimal Control Analysis  5
 
Figure 2. Real trade weighted value of dollar against major currencies.  REALTWD. 
NETFIGDPMA Net foreign investment/GDP, four quarter moving average.  A rise is an 













Figure 2. United States current account/GDP = net foreign investment/GDP = 
NETFIGDPMA, four quarter moving average (MA) and the real value of dollar against 
the major currencies = price adjusted major currencies dollar index = REALTWD. A rise 
is an appreciation of the US dollar.  Normalized variable = (variable - mean)/standard 
deviation. Period:1977q1 - 2004q2.  Source: Federal Reserve, Washington DC and 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, FRED data bank.  
 
The main group of the pessimists, such as Michael Mussa (2004), relies upon a 
quite simple argument.  If the current account deficit/GDP is constant at A and the ratio of 
external debt/GDP stabilizes at h, then the ratio of the current account deficit/debt is equal 
to g, the growth rate
4.  That is, the equilibrium debt ratio h is equal to current account 
deficit/GDP divided by the growth rate, equation (1).   
(1) h = A/g 
                                                 
4 This relation abstracts from the capital gains and losses resulting from changes in the exchange rate.  J.L. Stein, US Current Account Deficits: A Stochastic Optimal Control Analysis  6
This equation is valid for any constant current account deficit/GDP and positive 
growth rate
5.  It does not tell us what debt ratio is sustainable or answer Bernanke's 
question (B3) above.  The reason is the following.  If the current account deficit/GDP rises 
to a multiple of A then the equilibrium debt ratio will rise to a multiple of h.  Which of the 
infinitely stable debt ratios should set off early warning signals?
6   
Mussa and others consider several scenarios, involving a 5% per annum growth 
rate.  If the deficit A = 5% then the debt ratio h will converge to 100%.  If the deficit is  
reduced to 4% then the debt ratio converges to 80%.  Mussa concludes that no one knows, 
or can estimate with great confidence, the outer limits of the US net foreign liabilities that 
are sustainable in the sense that they would be tolerable to both US residents as net 
debtors and to the rest of the world residents as creditors.  All that he can say is that since 
no country of significance has ever run up an external debt ratio of 100%, it is prudent to 
conclude that this boundary should not be tested.  The conclusion is that this group of 
pessimists relies upon panel data of countries over time to form a subjective estimate of an 
early warning signal for the United States.  They do not provide a theoretical framework 
to answer questions (B3) and (B4) above.  
The current apprehensions of the main group of Pessimists - Mussa, Edwin 
Truman, and John Williamson - may represent the consensus feeling
7, but are not shared 
by all economists.  There is a group of Optimists, represented by Ben Bernanke and 
Richard Cooper.  The differences between the two main groups are subtle but significant. 
One can simply describe the Optimists' view via equation (2).  The current account 
deficit of the US (country 1) equals US investment less saving , where I = 
investment/GDP, S= saving/GDP and Y = GDP.  Investment less saving is a demand for 
resources from the rest of the world.  US current account deficits are financed by foreign 
                                                 
5 Let the current account deficit/GDP be A(t), which is not necessarily constant, and let the growth rate of 
GDP be constant at g > 0.  The dynamics of the debt ratio are: dh(t)/dt = A(t) - gh(t).  The solution is: h(t) = 
h(0) exp(-gt) + ∫ A(s) exp(-g(t-s)) ds, where t > s > 0.  If A(t) = A constant, then equation (1) is derived as t 
goes to infinity. 
6 Some economists call the Intertemporal Budget Constraint a situation where the debt ratio stabilizes at a 
finite level.  The above argument explains why an infinite number of current account deficits and debt ratios 
are consistent with dynamic stability. 
7 See the articles in Bergsten and Williamson, ed.  (2004) and in Policy Briefs in International Economics 
(2005).Both are publications of the Institute for International Economics.  J.L. Stein, US Current Account Deficits: A Stochastic Optimal Control Analysis  7
current account surpluses, which are saving less investment  (S2 - I2) Y2 - the supply of 
resources - from the rest of the world (country 2). 
(2)US current account deficit =( I1 - S1)Y1(t) =( S2 - I2 )Y2 (t)= Foreign current 
account surplus. 
The Optimists claim that the US investment ratio I1 tends to be high because the 
US offers more productive investment opportunities than do Japan and Europe.  The 
saving ratios are higher abroad (S2 > S1) than in the US.  Hence optimizing behavior by 
both leads to US current account deficits and foreign current account surpluses.  Both 
countries benefit from the flow of resources from the rest of the world to the US.  Insofar 
as (I1 - S1) is positive and (I2 - S2) is negative , as long as GDP is growing in both 
countries, there is no problem.  Continued US current account deficits are not causes for 
alarm, because foreigners are induced to absorb ever-growing quantities of US debt into 
their portfolios.   
Bernanke is explicit that one must take a global point of view in order to answer 
his questions.  An important factor driving US current account deficits has been the 
substantial shift in the current accounts of developing countries.  These shifts, together 
with the high saving propensities of Germany and Japan, have resulted in a global saving 
glut.  The increased supply of saving raised US equity values during the stock market 
boom and helped increase US home values.  As a consequence US saving declined and 
contributed to the US current account deficit.  He argues that this flow of resources has 
been desirable in the medium run, but in the longer term this pattern of flows could be 
counterproductive.  However, there is no explicit theoretical analysis linking the medium 
to the longer run. 
Cooper's analysis (2005, pp. 5-6) can be summarized within the framework of 
equation (2) above, and leads into our subsequent mathematical analysis.  The current 
account deficit of the United States is likely to continue for many years because it has 
been beneficial to both borrower and lender.  The excess saving in the rest of the world 
has been invested in the US where the rate of return has been higher.  The danger is not in 
the deficit per se, but that the deficit will finance consumption or investment with a lower 
rate of return than the interest rate paid on the debt.    J.L. Stein, US Current Account Deficits: A Stochastic Optimal Control Analysis  8
The implied error made by the "Pessimists " is that they assume that there is an 
intertemporal budget constraint (IBC) " that the debt must eventually be paid off"
8.  That 
is not the case, because there is a steady growth in the debt demanded by the rest of the 
world. Both sides of equation (2) are positive and growing.  Foreign excess savings seek 
the more productive investment opportunities in the US.  That is why the Optimists 
believe that there is no rational reason for alarm in the medium run.   
Catherine Mann's book, which represents the state of the art, contains a 
comprehensive and perceptive discussion of the issues and unresolved problems.  She 
poses the problem as follows. Whenever a country's current account deficit grows large, 
questions arise as to how large it can get, how long it can persist, and what forces might 
either stabilize it or cause it to shrink. The history of financial crises in Latin America and 
Asia, shows that too much external borrowing and/or accumulated international 
obligations can precipitate financial crises and subsequently economic disasters. But what 
is it that precipitates the crisis? Is it the size of the deficit or the accumulated obligations? 
Do their particular characteristics - such as maturity or currency or their use for 
consumption or real estate ventures - contribute to the economic forces that precipitate a 
crisis? 
To answer the question as whether the US current account deficit and net 
international investment position are sustainable one must define "sustainable" from two 
related perspectives: that of the net borrower (US) and that of the net investor (rest of the 
world). Experiences of different debtor countries with large current account deficits and 
net international obligations can help uncover empirical evidence of what constitutes 
sustainability. But will these be applicable to the US, or do different rules apply to the US 
because of the international role of the US dollar? The US is different from the rest of the 
world because of the depth and breadth of its financial markets and because it both 
borrows and lends principally in its own currency. 
First, Mann looks at the borrower's constraint. A negative net international 
investment position (NIIP) cannot increase without bounds, since ultimately net 
investment payments on the negative investment position would use all the resources of 
                                                 
8 The IBC has been used in many ways.  (i) The debt stabilizes according to equation (1) above.  (ii) The 
debt is ultimately paid off.  (iii) The present value of the debt goes to zero.  We explain below why none of 
these views is particularly helpful in answering Bernanke's questions (B3)-(B4) above.  J.L. Stein, US Current Account Deficits: A Stochastic Optimal Control Analysis  9
the economy, leaving nothing for domestic consumption. For the domestic economy, the 
importance of the stock of foreign claims is measured as NIIP/GDP.  The growth rate of 
the economy affects the denominator and the interest rate on debt obligations in the NIIP 
affects the numerator. She states that the higher the share of share of equity obligations 
(which have a contractual service requirement less strict than bank debt), the longer a 
country can run current account deficits - since the investment service likely is lower. In 
addition, the higher the share of obligations in the domestic currency, the less vulnerable 
the country is to exchange rate volatility.  She states that a country that borrows in its own 
currency at low interest rates and with a high share of equity can continue along a 
trajectory of spending and saving for longer than could a country that borrows in 
currencies other than its own, at high interest rates, and using fixed maturity debt. 
Second, she considers the portfolio constraints of the investors. How much lenders 
are willing to lend to residents of a country is a function of the risk-return profile of the 
borrower's assets relative to other assets as well as the investor's attitude toward risk and 
desire to diversify investments. The growth of the investor's home economy, the size of 
the global portfolio and the size of alternative investments are important determinants of 
how much of a country's assets the foreign investor wants.  If the variability of the rate of 
return on a foreign investment increases - because of variability either in interest rates or 
exchange rates - investment in that foreign asset generally declines. 
 
2. The Rationale of Using Stochastic Optimal Control and Dynamic Programming
9  
The reality is a world where there is uncertainty concerning the GDP, interest rate 
and exchange rate.  The technique of analysis used in this paper is based upon Stochastic 
Optimal Control/Dynamic Programming SOC/DP.  It is the appropriate technique to use 
in inter-temporal optimization in a world of uncertainty.  It provides a theoretical 
framework that contains Mann's analysis, can be implemented empirically, permits one to 
answer Bernanke's questions, and evaluate the arguments of the Pessimists and the 
Optimists.   
                                                 
9 Stein (2006, chapter 9) contains a technical analysis of the issues discussed in this paper.  Our aim here is 
to present the material in a manner that is accessible to economists who have an interest in this subject, 
especially from a policy perspective.  Therefore I stress the method of analysis and conclusions, use a 
minimum of equations and refer the reader to the above reference for proofs.  J.L. Stein, US Current Account Deficits: A Stochastic Optimal Control Analysis  10
The object is to select ratios of external debt/net worth, capital/net worth and 
consumption/net worth in a world of uncertainty that maximize a performance criterion, 
subject to the constraints of both the borrower and lender.  Consumption will be 
vulnerable to external shocks as a continuous function of the difference between the actual 
debt ratio and the derived optimal ratio.  At each step we relate the mathematical approach 
to the arguments of the Optimists and Pessimists. 
 
2.1 Debtor and Creditor Constraints 
Catherine Mann explicitly and Richard Cooper implicitly stressed that an "unduly 
large" external debt is a menace if it would endanger the level and the growth of per capita 
consumption.  The emphasis is upon the stock of debt not the current account deficit, 
which is its rate of change.  The inter-temporal pattern of consumption subject to 
constraints must be a focal point of the analysis of what is an optimal or a sustainable 
debt.   
A debtor constraint must be that, in the attempt to service the debt, the level of 
consumption must not be allowed to fall "too low".  If the debt burden - defined as the 
service of the external debt/GDP - is "too high", there are several possibilities.  One is that 
the debt would be "defaulted", in the sense that the terms of the contract would not be 
fulfilled.  Second, if the creditors correctly anticipate such a situation, there would be a 
capital outflow, and a financial crisis would be precipitated.  The constraints to the debtor 
can be understood from equation (3.1), the consumption of the debtor country - which is 
the United States.   
The US has claims on foreigners and foreigners have claims on the US.  For 
simplicity we just focus upon the net debt and not upon the components.  The US has a net 
external debt Lt where Lt is the debt denominated in US dollars.  The real interest rate at 
which the debt is serviced is it.  A negative debt is net foreign assets.   
Stochastic variables are written in bold letters.  Consumption Ct is equal to the 
Gross Domestic Product Yt less investment It less the servicing of the debt itLt.  The capital 
inflow is dLt, the change in the debt at the current exchange rate.  It is equal absorption 
less the Gross National Product.  A negative capital inflow is an outflow. 
 (3.1) Ct dt = (Yt - It - it Lt) dt + dLt > (C dt)min > 0.     J.L. Stein, US Current Account Deficits: A Stochastic Optimal Control Analysis  11
Y = GDP, C = consumption, I = investment, Lt = external debt denominated in $US, i 
=real interest rate ; Stochastic Variables Ωt = (Yt, it,) 
 
It is impossible to know what will be the future GDP and the real interest rate: 
stochastic variables vector Ωt.  A popular concept in the economics literature is the Inter-
temporal Budget Constraint (IBC).  This concept asserts that the paths of consumption and 
investment selected must be such that the expectation of the present value of the debt is 
zero.  This concept is irrelevant in a stochastic system, for the following reason.  Even if 
there were a plan that specified future values of consumption and investment, it is 
impossible to know what will be the future debt.  To see this, sum up the terms dLt from 
an initial date t = 0 to a future date T to derive equation (3.2).  Then the U.S. debt at later 
date T > t is (3.2) where the initial debt is L(0).  The integrand is the current account 
deficit. 
 (3.2) LT = ∫o 
T (Ct + It + it Lt - Yt)dt +L(0) 
Since vector Ωt = (Yt, it) is stochastic over the time horizon (0,T), it is impossible 
to predict terminal debt LT - even knowing the paths of consumption and investment. 
Consequently it makes no operational sense to state that the maximization process is based 
upon the IBC - that expected present value of the terminal debt should be either zero or 
any other quantity.  Such a "constraint" is unknowable and unenforceable. 
It is likely that Mussa's pessimistic views are based upon the concept of the IBC, 
whereas Cooper and Bernanke do not rely upon the IBC.  Instead of the IBC, in the 
stochastic optimization process there are constraints.  One debtor constraint is that 
consumption must always be positive, Ct > 0, regardless of Ωt the state of nature.  A 
second debtor constraint is that there be "no free lunch".  Consider each in turn.  Then we 
turn to the creditor constraints. 
It is quite likely that there are shocks/ vector Ωt that reduce drastically the GNP = 
Y - iL in equation (3.1).  In that case, consumption would have to be reduced drastically if 
the debt is to be serviced.  Can these shocks always be compensated for by new 
borrowing, a capital inflow dLt > 0, and maintain the level of consumption? A second 
debtor constraint must be imposed to prevent a "free lunch" or "Ponzi Scheme".  In a 
Ponzi Scheme or "free lunch" new borrowing is incurred to service the debt, so that  J.L. Stein, US Current Account Deficits: A Stochastic Optimal Control Analysis  12
absorption can continue to exceed GDP.  We exclude the "free lunch" possibility by 
introducing a variable called net worth Xt equal to capital Kt less debt Lt, equation (4), 
which we constrain to be positive.  Bankruptcy is a situation where net worth is zero or 
negative.   
(4) Xt = Kt - Lt > 0. 
The second debtor constraint - equation (4) - avoids the "free lunch" or bankruptcy 
problem in the following way.  If new borrowing is incurred to finance the debt payments 
or consumption, the debt of the economy Lt grows steadily, but capital Kt does not.  This 
means that net worth is driven down to zero and continues to become negative.  By 
constraining net worth to be positive, we preclude the "free lunch" problem.  Moreover if 
it is clear that the country is heading towards bankruptcy, there will be a capital flight dLt 
< 0 in equation (3.1).  Then consumption will be driven down to an intolerable level, even 
before the negative shocks occur.  
The debt LT in equation (3.2) can result from either private or public consumption 
or from investment.  The big difference is that if it results from consumption, net worth 
declines.  If this continues, net worth will be driven down to zero and violate the "no free 
lunch" constraint.  If it results from productive investment, then capital will also grow, 
and net worth will not be driven down to zero.  We shall see in the mathematical analysis 
below what are the determinants of optimal capital and investment. 
There is also a creditor constraint.  The US has both foreign assets denominated in 
foreign currency and liabilities to foreigners.  Since the US debt is generally denominated 
in US dollars, it would seem that there is no exchange risk to the debtor country, the US.  
This is wishful thinking, because there is an exchange risk to at least one of the countries.  
Either the exchange risk is faced by the debtor or by the creditor country.  A negative debt 
is a creditor position.  Each one selects the optimal debt or net foreign assets by taking the 
relevant risks and returns into account.  The debtor may disregard exchange risk, because 
the debt is denominated in his own currency.  However, creditor must consider the risk in 
order to be induced to hold the risky debt supplied.  Creditors will only do it if the debt 
supplied and interest rate charged take into account the exchange risk.  The creditor 
constraint is that the US debt supplied be equal to the optimum net foreign assets 
demanded.   J.L. Stein, US Current Account Deficits: A Stochastic Optimal Control Analysis  13
We state this constraint formally as Market clearing equation (5).  Denote the ratio 
of the optimal debt/net worth of country j = 1,2 by fj(t), and net worth by Xj(t).  A debtor 
has a positive, and a creditor has a negative, f(t).  The excess supply of US debt must be 
zero.  The optimal US debt supplied f1X1 is equal to the optimal debt demanded by the rest 
of the world.   
(5) f1(t)X1(t) + f2(t)X2(t) = 0. 
The next step derives the optimal debt ratios fj(t) for each country, subject to the 
constraints C > 0, X > 0 and market balance equation (5).   The inter-temporal 
optimization in the SOC/DP approach is based upon a criterion function and the stochastic 
processes for the GDP, real interest rates and exchange rates, to be discussed below. 
 
2.2  A Stochastic Optimal Control/Dynamic Programming (SOC/DP) Model
10  
The controversy between the Pessimists and the Optimists cannot be resolved 
without a consistent, theoretically founded, and empirically operational framework.  The 
Stochastic Optimal Control/Dynamic Programming SOC/DP analysis derives the optimal 
inter-temporal path of the utility of consumption, when there is uncertainty concerning the 
GDP, interest rate and also the exchange rate for the country that bears the exchange risk, 
vector Ωt.   
The "no bankruptcy" constraint equation (4) can be written as:1 = k - f, where k = 
K/X is the ratio of capital/net worth and f = L/X is the ratio of the external debt/net worth.  
Given the net worth, there is a 1-1 correspondence between the capital/net worth and 
debt/net worth ratios.  The object is to select (i) an external debt (or a net foreign asset) 
ratio, or a capital/net worth ratio, and (ii) a consumption/net worth ratio that maximize a 
performance criterion, subject to the constraints of both the borrower and lender, given 
the stochastic processes.  The "controls"/policy instruments must be selected given 
available information.  Since the future - vector Ωt - is unpredictable, decisions must be 
made based upon available information - the current state of the system. This is the raison 
d'être of the SOC/DP approach. 
                                                 
10 Technical details concerning the mathematics and use of stochastic optimal control/ dynamic 
programming are in: Fleming and Rishel, Fleming (2004) Fleming and Stein, Øksendal, Platen,and  Stein 
(2004) (2005)(2006).  J.L. Stein, US Current Account Deficits: A Stochastic Optimal Control Analysis  14
We have already discussed the constraints, and now turn to the Performance 
Criteria and the stochastic processes.   The performance criterion used here is the 
standard one in the economics and finance literature
11.  Select a consumption ratio ct and a 
debt ratio ft = kt - 1 to maximize the expectation (E) of the discounted value of the utility 
of consumption U(Ct) over an infinite horizon, subject to the debtor and creditor 
constraints above.  The stochastic variables are described by vector Ω = (Y,i,N). The 
criterion function V is equation (6), which will be used for the debtor or creditor in the 
appropriate way below.  
(6)V =  max c,f   EΩ ∫ U(Ct) e 
-δt dt,   ∞ > t > 0. 
c = C/X, f = L/X, k = K/X, 1 = k - f,  Ωt = (Yt, rt,Nt) 
The utility function selected should severely penalize low consumption.  In this 
way we avoid selecting a debt whose servicing would severely reduce consumption 
(equation 3.1), in the event that there are "bad shocks" to the stochastic variables: the 
GDP, real interest rate and exchange rate.  This is consistent with Mann's view of what is 
an excessive debt or one that is so high that it endangers consumption.  The finance 
literature, such as Merton (1990), uses utility function (6a) or (6b) where risk aversion (1-
γ) is positive.  In equation (6b), the logarithmic function, risk aversion is unity (γ = 0).  
This is a nice function to use, because low consumption produces very large negative 
utility.
12.  
(6a) U(Ct) = (1/γ)Ct
γ,  (1 - γ ) > 0,  γ ≠ 0 
(6b) U(Ct) =  ln Ct. 
The "discount rate (δ)" is just another way of specifying the effective length of the 
horizon.  A high discount rate emphasizes near term consumption, and a low discount rate 
emphasizes far term consumption.  The discount rate is a subjective variable, which may 
differ considerably between the debtor and creditor countries.   
The inter-temporal optimization problem arises because the system is dynamic.  
Decisions taken at the present concerning the debt, capital and consumption have 
consequences for future consumption.  A debtor has a positive L > 0, and a creditor has a 
                                                 
11 There are other very sensible criteria functions discussed in the papers of Fleming (2005) and Platen 
(2005). 
12 Negative values of γ are fine and in that case there need not be a discount rate to make V finite.  J.L. Stein, US Current Account Deficits: A Stochastic Optimal Control Analysis  15
negative L < 0, debt.  The inter-temporal optimization will determine if the country should 
be a debtor or a creditor, i.e., if the debt is positive or negative.  The state of the system is 
described by net worth Xt in equation (4), effective capital less debt.  The dynamics of the 
system, which takes into account the uncertainties concerning the GDP, interest rate and 
exchange rate, is described by a stochastic differential equation for the change in net 
worth.  The dynamic system at the core of inter-temporal optimization is the change in net 
worth dXt. The change in net worth dXt, equal to the change in effective capital less the 
change in debt, is precisely equal to St saving.   
The Gross Domestic Product Yt is the product of effective capital K = PQ and its 
productivity βt, so that Yt =  βt Kt = βt(PtQt) is the GDP.  Effective capital is the product of 
the "quantity" Q times its "quality" P.  The rate of technical progress dP/P is the growth of 
the "quality variable".  Both the productivity of effective capital βt and the rate of 
technical progress dPt/Pt are stochastic.   
The change in net worth for the U.S., country 1, is dX1t equal to the change in 
effective capital d(PQ) less the change in the debt dL = (C + I + iL - βK) dt, based upon 
equation (3.1). 
(7) dX1t = Kt (dPt/Pt + βt dt) -it Lt  dt - Ct dt = Saving  
  If there were no technical progress and no debt
13, then saving would be the product of 
effective capital and its productivity βtKt less Ct consumption.  If there is also technical 
progress then there is a bonus or real capital gain equal to dPt/Pt times effective capital Kt.  
In the absence of debt, saving St = Kt (dPt/Pt + βt dt) - Ct dt.  This part is valid for either 
the debtor or the creditor country.  Insofar as there is a dollar denominated debt, the 
saving is reduced by the net transfer payments it Lt  dt.  Real interest rate it subsumes 
interest and dividends.  Since the US debt is denominated in US dollars, there is no 
exchange rate involved in measuring the debt, when we ignore that the US also has 
foreign assets denominated in foreign currency. 
The dynamic system at the core of inter-temporal optimization is the change in net 
worth dXt.  Equation (7) is a stochastic differential equation because the terms in bold 
letters are stochastic. They are: the productivity of capital plus the rate of technical 
progress in the first term, and the real rate of interest in the second term.   
                                                 
13 A negative debt is a creditor position.  J.L. Stein, US Current Account Deficits: A Stochastic Optimal Control Analysis  16
The foreigner creditors hold US debt denominated in US dollars.  Therefore the 
net worth of country 2 the foreign country X2t is equation (8), equal to capital K2 = (PQ)2 
plus net foreign assets NL, where L is the US dollar denominated debt and N = foreign 
currency/$US.  A rise in N is an appreciation of the US dollar.  The foreign creditors 
benefit from an appreciation of the US dollar.  The change in net worth for the foreign 
country is equation (9).  The difference from the US equation concerns the creditor 
position of the foreign country.  The US debt L is an asset NtLt for the foreigner. 
The effective interest rate for the creditor rt is the US real long term interest rate it 
plus the appreciation of the US dollar, dNt/Nt.  The crucial stochastic variables for the 
foreign country are the productivity of capital bt and the effective real rate of interest rt = it 
+ dNt/Nt. equation (9a). 
(8) X2t = (PQ)2t + (NL)2t 
(9) dX2t = K2t (dPt/Pt + βt dt)2 + (it dt + dNt/Nt) NtLt  - C2t dt = Saving  
(9a) dX2t = b2K2t + rt NtLt  dt - C2t dt = Saving  
 
The stochastic variables are the returns to capital bt =  (dPt/Pt + βt dt) in both 
countries, the real rate of interest it and dNt/Nt ,the appreciation
14 of the US dollar.  
Variables bt and it are relevant for the US, whose net liabilities are denominated in US 
dollars.  For the foreign creditor, the exchange rate appreciation/depreciation dNt/Nt is also 
relevant.   
A very important issue is how to describe the underlying stochastic processes, 
which will determine the optimal controls: the debt/net worth ratio, capital/net worth ratio 
and consumption/net worth ratio.  A negative optimal debt ratio means that it is optimal 
for the country to be a creditor.  There are two reasonable possibilities summarized in 
BOX 1 for the US.  Each has a different solution for the optimal debt (positive or 
negative) ratio.  The empirical characteristics of the two variables - the return and real 
interest rate - are discussed in the data part 5 below. 
In the Prototype Model
15, it is assumed that both variables can be characterized as 
Brownian Motion/random walks with drift- BOX1, column 2/equations (10a)-(10b).  
                                                 
14 Variable N =  foreign currency/$US. If dN > 0, the dollar is appreciating and if dN < 0 the dollar is 
depreciating. 
15 The Prototype Model is fully discussed in Fleming and Stein (2004) and in Stein (2006).  J.L. Stein, US Current Account Deficits: A Stochastic Optimal Control Analysis  17
Brownian Motion [BM] should be viewed as a random walk in continuous time.  The 
second possibility [BM/EMR] is that the return is Ergodic Mean Reverting [EMR], 
BOX1, column 3/equations (11a)-(11b) and the effective interest rate is as before (10b) 
Brownian Motion with drift.  In case of the Prototype Model, the stochastic processes are 
that the return on capital bt is equal to a deterministic term, the mean b without a time 
subscript, plus a stochastic term σb dwb, with a zero expectation.  The real interest rate it 
has a deterministic mean r plus a stochastic term σr dwr with a zero expectation.  In the 
second case, the return is Ergodic Mean Reverting (EMR) with a mean of b with no time 
subscript, and a finite speed of convergence α.  Τhe real interest rate is BM with drift.     
 
BOX 1 Stochastic Processes  
Stochastic Variable  Col. (2)  
Prototype Model 
BM/BM 
Col. (3)  
EMR/BM 
Return on capital:  
bt dt =dPt/Pt + βt dt 
(10a) bt dt = b dt + σb dwb
  
E(bt) = b, var (bt) = σb
2dt     
Not stationary  
(11a) dbt = α(b - bt)dt + σbdwb  
(11b) bt => N(b, σb
2/2α) 
Stationary 
Real interest rate:  
 it dt 
 
(10b) it dt  = r dt + σr dwr    




(10b) i dt =r dt + σr dwr    
Not stationary 
 
For the foreign country, we consider the same two cases with one change.  Instead 
of the real interest rate it, we use the effective real interest rate rt = it + dNt/Nt.  The 
treatment of the real exchange rate for the foreign country as an exogenous stochastic 
process is questionable, since it depends upon productivity and thrift in both countries
16.  
For simplicity here, we ignore that important feedback and leave it for further research.  
Empirically, the mean appreciation dN/N is zero, but there is considerable variance.  
                                                 
16 This is developed in the NATREX model.  See Stein (2006, chapters 4-6).  J.L. Stein, US Current Account Deficits: A Stochastic Optimal Control Analysis  18
Therefore, the mean interest rate is r in both countries, and the only difference in the 
interest rate equation for the two countries is the variance of the interest rate.   
 
3. The solution for the optimal ratio of debt/net worth f > 0 or net assets/net worth f < 0. 
We use the method of dynamic programming (DP) to solve for the optimal ratios 
of debt/net worth f = L/X, capital/net worth K/X = k = 1 + f, consumption/net worth c = 
C/X for both countries.  The stochastic processes state that the future is unpredictable even 
if we knew the consumption and investment that will be selected in each period.  Hence 
the future debt at time LT in equation (3.2) is unknowable at present, even though the 
consumption and investment policies are predetermined.  That is why the SOC/DP 
approach is the foundation of our analysis.   
Solve for (f, k, c) that maximize performance criterion (6) given the dynamics of 
net worth (7) or (9), and the alternative stochastic processes involving the return on capital 
and the real interest rate in BOX 1.  The DP method of solution is quite technical and the 
reader is referred to Fleming and Stein (2004), Fleming and Soner (2005), Fleming and 
Rishel (1975), and Stein (2006), (2004) (2005) for the derivations and proofs.  Here, we 
shall try to present the results and arguments in a "reader friendly" way.   
The solution for the optimal debt/net worth f(z t) is equation (12), where as we 
explain below zt is a risk adjusted net return.  This equation is graphed as figure 3 for a 
general case, applicable to either a debtor or a creditor country.  When f is positive, it is 
optimal to be a debtor, and when f is negative it is optimal to be a creditor.  The optimal 
debt/net worth denoted f(z) is a linear function of z the risk adjusted net return.  The 
numerator of z is the net return - the return on capital less the effective real interest rate - 
and the denominator is the risk.  Both depend upon the stochastic processes, as discussed 
below.  We use equation (12)/figure 3 in describing the solution to either the Prototype 
Model or the EMR/BM model described above.  The optimal debt ratio for the US is Lt/Xt.   
(12) f(z) = Lt/Xt = z / (1-γ) + f(0)= (b - r)/(1-γ) σ
2 + f(0)  
The abscissa plots the risk adjusted net return, z = (b-r)/σ
2 .  The slope of the line 
is 1/(1-γ) the reciprocal of risk aversion.  The intercept f(0) is the optimal debt ratio when 
the mean net return is zero.  Intercept f(0) is precisely  the value of debt/net worth that 
minimizes risk.  Figure 3 is drawn for the case where, at zero net return, the country is  J.L. Stein, US Current Account Deficits: A Stochastic Optimal Control Analysis  19
neither a debtor nor a creditor.  In the case of BOX1/column 2, the risk adjusted net return 
is equation (13a).  The numerator (b-r) is the mean return on capital less the mean real 
interest rate.  The denominator is var (bt - it) the variance of the difference between return 
on capital and the real interest rate.  In the case of BOX1/column 3, the risk adjusted net 
return is equation (13b).  The numerator  (bt - r) is the current value of the return less the 
mean value of the real interest rate.  The denominator is the variance of the real interest 
rate. 
(13a) zt = (b-r)/var (b-i)  Box1/column 2 
(13b) zt = (bt - r)/var (i)  BOX1/column 3 
So far, we have been looking at the situation from the point of view of the debtor, 
the U.S.  The situation viewed from the creditor's side is symmetrical, and can also be 
described by equations (12) - (13) and figure 3.  Since it has been assumed that the 
creditor bears the exchange risk, the variance of the effective interest rate for country 2 
includes the variance of the exchange rate.  J.L. Stein, US Current Account Deficits: A Stochastic Optimal Control Analysis  20
 
Figure 3. Optimal Debt/Net Worth linear function of risk adjusted net return 
 
 
Figure 3.  Optimal debt/net worth f equation (12) is a linear function of the risk 
adjusted mean net return z = (b-r)/σ
2.  Debtor country is at z = z1 and creditor country is 
at z2.  In the figure, f(0) = 0, a country is neither a debtor or a creditor if the risk adjusted 
net return is zero. Both countries have the same risk aversion.  Slope of the line is 1/(1-γ) 
the reciprocal of risk aversion.   
 
The US is country 1 and the rest of the world is country 2.  The optimal debt/net 
worth ratio is f1 for the US and f2 for the foreign country, according to equations (12) and 
(13).  In figure 3, the US has a risk adjusted return of z1 and an optimal debt ratio of f1.   
Country 2 has a risk adjusted return of z2 and an optimal debt ratio of f2.  Figure 3 
describes a situation where both countries have the same risk aversion (1-γ) and the 
intercept f(0) is zero.  The latter condition means that if domestic return on capital were 
equal to the effective interest rate, b = r, the country would neither be a debtor or a 
creditor.  The risk aversion coefficient determines the slope of the line.  The lower is risk 
aversion , the greater is the slope of the line and the greater is the optimal debt ratio, for 
any risk adjusted net return.  The appropriate measure of the risk adjusted net return z  J.L. Stein, US Current Account Deficits: A Stochastic Optimal Control Analysis  21
depends upon the stochastic process, as summarized in BOX 1 and equations (13a) and 
(13b).   
The optimal capital/net worth follows immediately from the equations (12) and the 
definition of net worth X = K - L.  The country with a positive risk adjusted net return z > 
0 will borrow to finance capital formation.  Its capital/net worth k = 1 + f can be read 
directly from the vertical axis in figure 3.  
A frequently asked question is whether the foreigners are willing to hold the US 
debt?  Will the optimal amount of US debt supplied X1f1 be equal to the optimal amount -
X2f2 that the foreigners want to hold
17?  Equations (12) and (13) are necessary but not 
sufficient to determine the optimal debt ratio.  One must impose a "market balance" 
constraint, that the optimal debt supplied by the debtor must be equal to the optimal debt 
demanded by the creditor.  The equilibrating variable is the mean real rate of interest.  The 
market balance solution is as follows. 
Market balance, when both countries select the optimal debt ratios is equation 
(14).  The optimal supply of US debt is X1 f1 and the optimal debt supplied by the 
foreigners is X2 f2 based upon equation (12), assuming that f(0) = 0.  Each country (j =1, 
2) has a return on capital bj and risk σj
2 as described above.  Substitute equations (12) for 
both countries into (14), and derive equation (15).  Parameters ξ and R are defined in (a) 
and (b).  This is market balance when each country selects the optimal debt ratio and the 
US debt supplied is the optimal quantity demanded by the foreigners. 
(14) X1 f1 + X2 f2 = 0    Xj = net worth of country j. 
(12) fj = (bj -r)/(1-γj)σj
2,  Optimal debt/net worth, j = 1,2 
(15) ξ (b1 -r)/R1
  + (1-ξ) (b2 -r)/R2 = 0. 
 (a) ξ  = X1/(X1 + X2), fraction of world net worth owned by country 1.   
 (b) Rj = (1-γj)σj
2 , product of risk times risk aversion in the j-th country.  
The common world rate of interest in equation (16) is a weighted average of the 
productivity of capital in each country bj, where weight m is defined in equation (17).  The 
                                                 
17 The debt ratio of a country is f > 0.  When f < 0, the country is a creditor.    J.L. Stein, US Current Account Deficits: A Stochastic Optimal Control Analysis  22
world mean rate of interest depends upon the risk, risk aversion
18 and productivity of 
capital in both countries.  . 
(16) r = b1 m + b2 (1-m) 
(17) m = (ξ/R1)/[(ξ/R1) + (1-ξ)/R2) ] 
The risk is the variance σ
2 = var (b - r), according to the stochastic process 
summarized in BOX 1.  The currency denomination of the debt enters in the risk if the 
asset or liability is denominated in the currency of the counterpart country.  The expected 
depreciation of the US dollar dN/N is realistically assumed to be zero.  Although the mean 
rate of interest does not include the exchange rate, there is a variance to the exchange rate, 
so that it does appear in the variance term for one of the countries.  If the country faces no 
exchange risk, then the variance of r is just the variance of the interest rate.  If it does face 
an exchange risk, then the variance of r is the variance of the sum of the interest rate and 
the exchange rate depreciation. 
Solve for the optimal debt ratio when both the debtor and creditor countries are 
optimizing (equation (12) for each country respectively) and there is market balance 
(equation 14/15).  In that situation the optimal US debt is no menace, but reflects 
optimization on the part of all countries.   
Substitute the equilibrium interest rate equation (16) into equation (13a) or (13b) 
for each country to derive the risk adjusted return.  For simplicity assume that net worth is 
the same in the US and in the rest of the world, X1(t) = X2(t)  
The US risk adjusted net return z1 = (b1 - r)/σ1
2 will be positive if the mean return 
in the US exceeds that in the rest of the world.  In that case, the net return in the foreign 
country (b2 - r) will be negative.  This is the situation described in equation (18a) for the 
US and (18b) for the rest of the world. 
(18a) b1 - r = (1-m)(b1 - b2) > 0. 
(18b) b2 - r = -m(b1 - b2) < 0 
Substitute (18a) and (18b) into the optimal debt/net worth equation (12) for j = 1,2.  
Then equations (19a) and (19b) are the solutions for the optimal debt/net worth ratios for 
the US and for the creditor country respectively.  Term Rj = (1-γj)σj
2 is risk times risk 
                                                 
18 Figure 3 was drawn upon the assumption that both countries have the same risk aversion, but the 
mathematical analysis does not make this assumption.  J.L. Stein, US Current Account Deficits: A Stochastic Optimal Control Analysis  23
aversion.  Risk aversion is a preference variable, which will differ among countries.  Risk, 
the variance, will depend upon the stochastic processes relevant to each country.   
The implications of these equations are discussed in the next section.  We explain 
that the optimal debt ratio for the US does not depend upon which country bears the 
exchange risk.  The currency denomination of the debt is irrelevant, since the Market 
Balance constraint is imposed.  The optimum debt demanded by the creditor must be 
equal to the optimal debt supplied by the debtor. 
 (19a) f1 =(1-m) (b1 - b2)/R1 > 0     debtor 
(19b) f2 = - m(b1 - b2)/R2 < 0      creditor 
 Rj = (1-γj)σj
2  Risk  aversion   (1-γj) > 0 times σj
2risk for country j = 1,2 
Ratio m defined in (b) above. 
 
4. The Contributions of the Stochastic Optimal Control Analysis to the Debate 
The Stochastic Optimal Control/Dynamic Programming analysis provides both 
theoretical precision and quantitative answers to the issues raised by Mann.  Bernanke 
questions (B1)-(B4) can be answered, and the debate between the Pessimists and 
Optimists can be evaluated, using the SOC/DP framework of analysis summarized in 
equations (12) and (19).  In this section, we provide a theoretical explanation and in 
section 5, we apply the theoretical framework to the data.  
Bernanke and the International Monetary Fund asked whether from a global 
perspective it desirable that the rich US should be borrowing in the international capital 
market from the capital poor countries.  The Optimists and Pessimists disagreed whether 
the US current account deficits and resulting external debt are menaces that require urgent 
correction.  Will the foreigners be content to hold the growing amount of debt resulting 
from US current account deficits?  Each side raised significant issues.  The main problem 
was they did not provide an objective theoretical framework that can be empirically 
implemented to obtain quantitative estimates and thereby resolve the issues. 
Figure 4 based upon equations (12) and (19) is helpful in answering these 
questions in a "reader friendly" way
19.  It relates the optimal debt supplied or demanded as 
a function of the real rate of interest.  The equation of each curve in figure 4 for j = 1,2, 
                                                 
19 The underlying technical issues, derivations and proofs  are in Stein (2006, ch. 9).  J.L. Stein, US Current Account Deficits: A Stochastic Optimal Control Analysis  24
when f(0) = 0 is (12a), which is just another way to write equation (12).   
(12a) r = bj - (1-γj)σj
2 fj, = bj - Rjfj 
For expositional simplicity, the situation in figure 4 assumes that net worth is the 
same in both countries X1t = X2t.  This is a special case of the mathematical solution 
above.  Curve US (j = 1) is the optimal US debt supplied, and curve ROW (j = 2), is the 
optimum demand for US debt by the rest of the world.  If the real rate of interest is r = b1, 
then the US will be neither a debtor nor a creditor.  The higher the real rate of interest, the 
lower the debt supplied.  The slope of the curve is -R1 , minus the product of risk times 
risk aversion.  Curve ROW is the optimal US debt demanded by the rest of the world.  At 
a real rate of interest r = b2, the rest of the world will be neither a debtor nor a creditor.  
The higher the real rate of interest on US debt, the greater the amount of US debt 
demanded.  The slope of the ROW curve is R2, the product of risk and risk aversion in the 
rest of the world.   
The Market Balance at point P = (r, f*), is the general equilibrium solution.  It 
simultaneously determines the (i) equilibrium real rate of interest and (ii) f* the optimum 
debt supplied by the US is equal to the optimal US debt demanded by the rest of the 
world, f* = f1 = -f2.  The optimal US debt supplied and demanded is Lt = f* Xt and grows 
with the rate of growth of net worth.  This is a sustainable and optimal situation, where 
the US is supplying the optimal debt and the rest of the world is optimally holding the US 
debt.  In the Prototype Model BOX 1/column 2, the optimal debt ratio fj = f* (in equation 
(12)) is constant.  At these optimal debt ratios, each country is maximizing the expected 
discounted value of consumption over an infinite horizon.  This answers the question of 
how large a debt is optimal for both countries. 
  J.L. Stein, US Current Account Deficits: A Stochastic Optimal Control Analysis  25
 
Figure 4. General Equilibrium. Optimal debt supplied f1 by US, Optimal debt demanded f2 
by rest of world ROW.   
 
Figure 4. General Equilibrium Solution.  Market Balance solution for world real interest 
rate and equality of optimal US debt supplied and optimal US debt demanded by the rest 
of the world, when net worth is the same in both countries.  
 
4.1. Should the US be a debtor to the rest of the world ?   
There is a widespread consternation why the richest country in the world the US should be 
a debtor to the rest of the world
20.  The consternation is derived from the simple Neo-
Classical model that assumes countries have similar smooth concave production functions 
in capital and labor and that international differences in the return on capital are related to 
the corresponding differences in the capital/labor ratio
21.  R. Rajan (2006) of the 
International Monetary Fund argues that reforms are needed to reverse the paradox that 
the poor countries are financing the rich United States.  The answer to the "paradox" is 
                                                 
20 See both Bernanke's views stated above and the International Monetary Fund, WEO, Sept. 2005, p.100. 
21 This type of thinking led to the prediction that, upon the German reunification, the productivity of capital 
would be much higher in East Germany than in the West.  Thereby there would be capital inflow and a 
higher growth rate in the East.    J.L. Stein, US Current Account Deficits: A Stochastic Optimal Control Analysis  26
derived from our analysis, which is summarized in equations (19a) and (19b) figure 4, and 
equation (12) figures 3.  Who should be the debtor and who should be the creditor 
depends upon z the risk adjusted net return capital.  According to equations (19a)-(19b), it 
is optimal for the US (country 1) to be a debtor country to the rest of the world if z = (b1 - 
b2)/R1 > 0, if the risk adjusted return on capital is higher in the US.  This is the situation 
graphed in figure 4.  It is an empirical question whether Z is higher or lower in the US 
than in the creditor countries.  This issue is discussed in part 5 below. 
 
4.2. Currency denomination and effects of risk times risk aversion 
Catherine Mann and others claim that the denomination of the US debt in US 
dollars allows the US to have a larger debt than if it were denominated in foreign 
currency, because there is a smaller exchange rate risk.  That view ignores the fact that the 
foreigners would be incurring the exchange rate risk and that their optimal demand for US 
debt would thereby be affected.  Equations (19a)-(19b) graphed in figure 4 explain why 
the optimal US debt is affected by the risk times risk aversion in both countries.   
Specifically, in the simple but realistic case where net worth is equal in both 
countries, the optimal equilibrium ratio f in equations (19a) and (19b) is (20).  The 
denominator R is the sum of risk times risk aversion in the two countries Rj = (1-γj)σj
2. 
(20) f1 = -f2 = (b1 - b2)/R,   R = R1 + R2. 
It is the sum R of risk times risk aversion in the two countries that is relevant for 
the optimal debt of the US, not the risk times risk aversion of the US by itself.  For 
example, the US debt is denominated in US dollars, so that the risk is just σ1
2 = var(b1 - i) 
the variance of the difference between the return on capital and the real interest rate, but 
not the variance of the exchange rate.  The slope of the curve US is minus risk times US 
risk aversion.  The foreign country must therefore bear the exchange risk.  Therefore the 
risk for the foreign country σ2
2 = var (b2 - r), where r = real interest rate i plus exchange 
rate depreciation dN/N , as stated in equation (9a) above.  The slope of the foreign curve 
ROW is risk times risk aversion.   
Let the initial equilibrium be at point P in figure 4.  R2 risk times risk aversion in 
the rest of the world ROW may rise either because there is more of an exchange risk or 
that they become more risk averse.  Their demand for US debt declines.  The ROW curve  J.L. Stein, US Current Account Deficits: A Stochastic Optimal Control Analysis  27
going through b2 becomes steeper.  The world rate of interest rises, to produce market 
balance.  The rise in the mean world rate of interest decreases the US net return (b1 - r) 
and, in turn, the US debt supplied declines.  The equilibrium optimal US debt ratio moves 
from P in the direction of North-West.  Similarly, if R1 risk times risk aversion in the US 
rises, then the curve in figure 4 labeled US going through return b1 becomes steeper/more 
negative.  The optimal debt supplied by the US declines, and the real interest rate declines.  
The foreign demand for US debt declines accordingly.  Because the optimal debt ratio is 
inversely proportional to R world risk times risk aversion, it does not matter which 
country bears the exchange risk
22.  Equation (20)/figure 4 is quite general.  There can be 
significant differences in risk times risk aversion in the two countries.   
 
4.3. Vulnerability 
Catherine Mann correctly stressed that an "unduly large" external debt is a menace 
insofar as it would endanger the level and growth of consumption
23.  The SOC/DP 
analysis makes this view precise and operational.  Equation (3.1) above shows how the 
level of consumption is stochastic because the GDP, real interest rate and exchange rate 
are stochastic.  Specifically, the stochastic effects upon consumption come from the 
stochastic net return.  We explain precisely what is an "unduly large" external debt burden 
net payments to foreigners/GDP, that makes the economy more "vulnerable' to shocks. 
Define Vulnerability to shocks as the probability that shocks to the net return will 
lead to a decline in consumption.  The relation between vulnerability and debt ratios can 
be described by the distribution function of the growth rate of consumption in figure 5.  
The probability of a decline in the level of consumption, which is a negative growth of 
consumption, is the area under the curve to the left of the origin.  The area under the curve 
to the left of the origin is directly related the deviation of the actual debt ratio from the 
optimal ratio.  This proposition is proved in Fleming and Stein (2004) and in Stein (2006, 
ch. 3).  The greater is the area under the curve to the left of the origin, the more vulnerable 
the economy is to external shocks.  
                                                 
22 Figure 3 was drawn on the assumption that there is a common value for risk aversion (1-γ), but different 
risk adjusted net returns.  This was just done for visual clarity and facilitates the exposition and 
interpretation of the empirical results.   
 
23 See section (2.1) above.  J.L. Stein, US Current Account Deficits: A Stochastic Optimal Control Analysis  28
The optimal debt ratio is f(z1) and total debt is f(z1)X1(t) in figure 3.  At this debt 
ratio, the expected growth rate of consumption and net worth is maximal, for any given 
ratio of consumption to net worth.  In this case, the debt is financing productive 
investment such that the ratio of capital/net worth k = 1 + f(z1).  
If the debt rises because it is financing consumption rather than productive 
investment, then the actual debt will rise - and net worth will decline
24 - without a 
corresponding rise in z the risk adjusted net return.  As the actual debt ratio rises from P to 
Q above the line in figure 3, then the distribution function of the growth rate of 
consumption in figure 5 shifts to the left with a lower mean and higher variance
25.   
When bad shocks occur to the return and interest rate, there is an increase in the 
probability of a decline in consumption and net worth.  That is why the vulnerability of the 
economy to bad shocks increases continuously as the debt ratio exceeds the optimal ratio.  
This proposition, derived from our SOC/DP analysis, allows one to evaluate the 
arguments of the pessimists and the optimists. 
 
                                                 
24 Recall that net worth X equals capital K less debt L.   
25 The method of thinking here is very similar to that of Value at Risk VaR concept in the finance literature.  J.L. Stein, US Current Account Deficits: A Stochastic Optimal Control Analysis  29
 
Figure 5.  Probability distribution function of the growth of consumption. Vulnerability is 
the probability of a decline. 
 
Figure 5. Vulnerability to shocks from the return or effective interest rate is the probability 
that they will reduce the rate of consumption.  This is the region where growth of 
consumption is negative.  If the actual debt ratio f(t) exceeds the optimal f(z), the mean of 
the distribution shifts to the left and the variance increases.  The probability increases that 
consumption declines. . 
 
4.4 Effect of foreign productivity of capital upon optimal US debt and current account 
deficit 
The analysis above explains how the foreign productivity of capital affects the 
optimal US debt/net worth, US capital/net worth and current account deficit.  Start with 
US as a debtor and the rest of the world as a creditor, point P in figure 4, where f1 = -f2 = 
(b1 - b2)/R is positive
26.  
Let the return on capital b2 in the foreign country decline.  The ROW curve shifts 
downward with a lower intercept but the same slope.  The ROW curve shifts down and 
intersects the US curve to the right of P.  Then the optimal net US assets demanded by the 
foreign country rises.  The world rate of interest declines and induces an increase in the 
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optimal debt supplied by the US.  The new market balance situation is that the optimal US 
debt has risen due to the decline in the foreign rate of return.   
The optimum US current account deficit follows directly.  In the Prototype Model, 
the ratio of debt/net worth = f* is constant.  The current account deficit dLt = f* dXt.  In 
the partial equilibrium analysis (equation 12/figure 3) the ratio of the current account 
deficit/net worth is equation (21a).  The growth rate of net worth dXt/Xt is denoted gt.  The 
value of the optimal expected growth rate is derived in Fleming and Stein (2004), Stein 
(2005) (2006, ch. 3).  In the general equilibrium analysis (BOX 2/figure 4), the optimal 
current account deficit/net worth is equation (21b). 
(21a) dLt/Xt = [(b-r)/(1-γ1)σ1
2]gt 
(21b) dLt/Xt = [(b1 - b2)/R]gt 
In both cases, it is optimal for the US to have current account deficits if the net 
return - the term in brackets - is positive.  The important quantitative questions are: how 
large should the deficit be? Should it be constant?  We discuss these issues in part 5 
below. 
 
5.  Evaluation of arguments of Pessimists and Optimists on the basis of Stochastic 
Optimal Control/ Dynamic Programming Model   
5.1.  Research design 
The views of the Pessimists and the Optimists are insightful, but they are not based 
upon a consistent framework of analysis that can provide quantitative answers to 
Bernanke's questions (B1)-(B4) in part 1 above.  They cannot explain: What is an 
operational quantitative meaning to the terms "sustainable" and "vulnerable."  Unless that 
is done, one cannot answer the questions: Is the U.S. external debt a cause for alarm?  Are 
US current account deficits/GDP leading to an "unsustainable" situation?  We derived 
optimization equations for the debt ratio and determined which country should optimally 
be the creditor and which one should optimally be the debtor.  Vulnerability of 
consumption to shocks is positively related to the difference between the actual and 
optimal debt ratio.   
We analyze the situation in several ways that are summarized in BOX 2, based 
upon equation (12)/figure 3 and equations (19a)-(19b),(20)/figure 4.  Objectively, there  J.L. Stein, US Current Account Deficits: A Stochastic Optimal Control Analysis  31
are two alternative stochastic processes, summarized in BOX 1.  We can view the optimal 
debt ratio either directly from the partial equilibrium point of view of the US, where the 
real rate of interest is given (equation 12), or from the general equilibrium point of view 
where both the US and the ROW are holding the optimal amounts of debt or foreign assets 
and there is also market balance (equations 19a-19b, 20, figure 4).  The ROW is optimally 
holding the US debt, which is optimally supplied.  The optimal capital/net worth ratio k = 
1 + f.    J.L. Stein, US Current Account Deficits: A Stochastic Optimal Control Analysis  32
 
 BOX  2 
Optimal debt/net worth f = k - 1,  k = capital/net worth  
  [A][B] partial equilibrium optimization.   
[A] f = mean (b - r)/(1-γ) σ
2       σ
2 = var (b-r) 
[B] f = (bt - mean r)/ (1-γ)σ
2       σ
2 = var (r) 
  [C] general equilibrium optimization 
[C] f = (b1 - b2)/R    R  =  R1 + R2 ,     Rj = (1-γj)σj
2 
Symbols: bj = return on capital, country j = 1,2;  
US: r = i = real rate of interest; debt is denominated in US dollars;  
ROW: r = i + dN/N; dN/N = dollar appreciation (+)/depreciation (-).   
[A] = Prototype Model; [B] = Ergodic mean reversion for bt, BM for r.  [C] Countries 
have equal net worth.  It is assumed that f(0) = 0, if (b-r) = 0, the country is neither debtor 
nor creditor.  Risk aversion (1-γj) > 0. 
 
There are two alternative stochastic processes
27.  In the Prototype Model BOX 
1/column 2, both the return on capital bt and the real long term interest rate are described 
as Brownian Motion with drift [BM].  This implies [A] in BOX 2.  The numerator of the 
risk adjusted net return is the mean net return (b-r) and the denominator σ
2 is the variance 
of the net return.  The second case EMR/BM is when the return on capital bt is ergodic 
mean reverting and the real rate of interest rt is Brownian Motion with drift: BOX 
1/column 3.  This implies [B] in BOX 2.  The numerator of the risk adjusted net return is 
the current return bt less the mean real rate of interest.  The denominator is the variance of 
the real rate of interest.  Cases [A][B] refer to partial equilibrium equation (12)/figure 3, 
where the real rate of interest is exogenous.  Insofar as the US debt is denominated in US 
dollars, there is no exchange risk for the US.  Case [C] is based upon general equilibrium 
equations (19a)-(19b), (20)/figure 4, where the real rate of interest is endogenous.  In case 
[C] the debt supplied by the US is exactly equal to the optimal US debt demanded by the 
                                                 
27 The presentation here is "reader friendly".  Technical details and proofs of the mathematical statements 
here are in Stein (2006, chapters 9 and 3), (2005).   J.L. Stein, US Current Account Deficits: A Stochastic Optimal Control Analysis  33
ROW.  The appropriate measure of the net return and risk depends upon the stochastic 
process, as explained above. 
In each case noted in BOX 2, we derive estimates of the optimal debt/net worth 
f(zt) for the U.S.  The only variable that is not objective is the preference variable, risk 
aversion (1-γ), which is based upon a utility function.  This implies that the level of the 
optimal debt depends upon preferences.  However, for any arbitrary risk aversion the 
variation of the optimal debt is objectively measured.  Then we convert the optimal 
debt/net worth ratio into the optimal ratio of debt/GDP denoted by h(zt) where the 
argument zt of net return indicates that we are referring to the optimal quantity.  Estimates 
are derived for the actual ratio of US "debt"/GDP.  Finally we can compare the actual to 
the optimal debt ratio and derive a measure of vulnerability Ψt = h(zt) - ht.  In this manner 
we can evaluate the arguments of the Pessimists and the Optimists, and answer Bernanke's 
questions in an objective and quantitative manner.  The SOC/DP mathematical analysis is 




Return on capital 
In each case in BOX 2, we estimate the return on capital directly.  In cases [A][B], 
the partial equilibrium approach, the real rate of interest is exogenous to the US.  In case 
[C], the general equilibrium approach, the real rate of interest is endogenous and is 
determined by the optimum quantities of debt supplied and demanded.   
There have been several different ways to compare the return to capital b among 
countries
29.  We choose the estimates that are most consistent with the optimization 
model.  The return on capital for the country as a whole dy/dK is equation (22).  It is the 
change in real GDP divided by the change in capital.  It can be expressed as the ratio of 
(g= dy/y) the growth rate of the GDP divided by (j= I/y) the ratio of real gross private 
domestic investment/GDP. 
(22) b = dy/dK = (dy/y)/(I/y) = g/j. 
                                                 
28 Almost all of the data used in this paper are from: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, FRED.  See Stein 
(2006, chapter 9) for details and for graphs of the relevant variables 
29 See International Monetary Fund WEO September 2005 Box 2.2.  J.L. Stein, US Current Account Deficits: A Stochastic Optimal Control Analysis  34
Variable b in equation (22) expresses the additional output that is made available 
when there is capital formation.  In some cases the output is used for wages, in others for 
reported profits of corporations or non-incorporated enterprises and in others for taxes.  
Variable b is an all-inclusive measure of the social return on capital formation that can 
affect social consumption in equation (3).  It captures all the sources income that 
constitutes the GDP.  Moreover, the measured return in (22) is a real return and is not 
confounded by what has been happening in asset markets, such as bubbles.   
In the partial equilibrium cases [A][B] in Box 2, we also need the real long-term 
rate of interest rt to derive the net return.  On the basis of the ADF statistics, the return bt 
is stationary/ mean reverting, but the real long term interest rate rt is not necessarily so.  
Hence the case [B] in BOX 2 is probably a better description than case [A].  Figure 6 is a 
histogram of the difference (b-r) called NETRETURN1.  From the data
30 underlying these 
figures, we derive both the net return (bt - rt) and the variance σ
2.   
 











Mean        0.175070
Median    0.201872
Maximum   0.539108
Minimum -0.310586
Std. Dev.    0.148278
Skewness   -0.615181





Figure 6. Histogram and descriptive statistics of net return NETRETURN1 = bt - rt, where 
bt is the return and rt is the real long term interest rate. 
                                                 
30 A full description of the data is in Stein (2006, chapter 9).  J.L. Stein, US Current Account Deficits: A Stochastic Optimal Control Analysis  35
In the general equilibrium case [C] where the real interest rate is endogenous, we 
need an estimate of the US less foreign returns (b1 - b2) on capital.  It is done in the 
following way.  Using the measure of return on capital in equation (22), the differential 
return is equation (23).  It is expressed in terms of growth rates g, investment ratios j 
between the US and foreign countries. 
(23)(b1 - b2)t = [(g1/j1) - (g2/j2) 
In fact the investment ratios for the US, Japan and the EU have been similar at j = 
20% in recent years
31.  The US investment ratio has been relatively constant at this level 
since 1997. The differential return for the US (country 1) can be expressed as equation 
(23a).  It is proportional to the difference in the returns on capital.  The factor of 
proportionality is 1/j.   
(23a) (b1 - b2) = (1/j)(g1 - g2). 
In the general equilibrium case [C] in BOX 2, the optimal debt/net worth ratio for 
the US is equation (24).  It is proportional to the difference in growth rates, where the 
factor of proportionality α = 1/jR. 
 (24) f(z;γ) = (g1 - g2)/jR  = α (g1 - g2) 
The ratio h of debt/GDP in equation (25) is derived from the ratio f of debt/net 
worth in BOX 2 using the definition
32 of net worth X = K - L  
(25) h = L/Y = (L/X) (X/Y) = f /b(1+f),   b = Y/K is the productivity of capital. 
Thereby, measures of vulnerability Ψt = h(zt) - ht are obtained.  
 
Measurement of Net Liabilities 
 
The controversy between the Pessimists and the Optimists concerns the "external 
debt", which is a negative net international investment position (NIIP).  If one claims that 
it is or is not a menace it is important to know what variable one is measuring.  There are 
however difficult measurement problems
33. First, the net assets (or debt when it is 
                                                 
31 International Monetary Fund, WEO Sept. 2005, pp. 93-94. 
32 The debt/net worth must exceed minus one. 
33 See "Measuring a Country's Net External Position", International Monetary Fund, WEO (2005, April, 
Box 3.2, chapter III).  J.L. Stein, US Current Account Deficits: A Stochastic Optimal Control Analysis  36
negative) is a stock of claims in the form of equities, direct investment, long-term debt, 
short-term debt of the private and public sectors, bank claims and real estate, owned by 
the corporate and non-corporate sectors.  It is difficult to measure the market values of 
these claims, just as it is difficult to measure the "capital" of a country.  Second, the US 
has claims on foreigners denominated in foreign currency and liabilities to foreigners, 
which are generally denominated in US dollars.  Third, the values of the claims fluctuate 
considerably, as a result of fluctuations in the stock market, real estate markets, interest 
rates and the exchange rate.  If the foreign stock markets are booming, then the value of 
US assets abroad rises.  If in addition the value of the dollar depreciates, then the dollar 
value of US assets abroad rises.  Such price rises can increase the value of net foreign 
assets/decrease the value of net foreign debt - even though the current account of the US 
continues to be in deficit.  Of course, the argument can go the other way.  If the US stock 
and real estate markets appreciate rapidly and the value of the dollar rises, then the 
measured US net external debt rises.  It would be most problematic to argue that the 
"external debt" is or is not a serious problem, when the measure of the net debt can 
fluctuate considerably as a result of bubbles in the real estate and stock markets, as well as 
from speculative short-term fluctuations in the exchange rate.  We doubt that these 
valuation adjustments are useful to answer the question: Is the U.S. external debt a cause 
for alarm? 
Our approach, which is quite common in the literature, is to measure the net asset 
position W(t) by cumulating the current account wt equal to net foreign investment.
34  The 
net external assets are the sum of the current accounts from an arbitrary time t = 0 up until 
the present, which is the integral on the right hand side of equation (26).  The transitory 
capital gains or losses from the price effects are ignored, because they have means of zero 
and considerable variance
35.  Define W(t) as the "core net foreign assets".  The "core net 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
34 This is the series NETFI taken from FRED. 
35 The mean percentage change in the real value of the dollar, over our sample period, was -0.02 with a 
standard deviation of 0.24. Hence the expected valuation adjustment due to exchange rate changes is not 
significantly different from zero.  J.L. Stein, US Current Account Deficits: A Stochastic Optimal Control Analysis  37
external debt", what we call "L", is the negative of W(t).  Henceforth, when we refer to 
net foreign assets, it refers to the core
36 measure W(t). 
 (26) W(T) =∫ 
T wt dt + W(0),      T > t > 0  wt = current account 
Our sample period is 1977q1 - 2004q2.  Assume that the net asset position at the 
initial date t(0) = 1977q1  is the capitalized value of the balance of investment income (the 
numerator), where the capitalization factor is the growth rate at that date (the 
denominator).  Thus the initial position is that of the US is a creditor W(0) = $4.655 (10
9 ) 
/ 0.043 = $108.26 (10
9)  This gives us W(0).  Subsequently the value of net external assets 
is derived recursively by adding the current account w(t) to obtain: W(t) = W(t-1) + w(t).  
Divide the cumulative sum W(t) by the GDP of the period y(t) and derive a measure of the 
ratio of net external assets/GDP = W(t)/y(t).  If W(t) is negative, it is a net debt.  The 
results are not sensitive to the estimate of the initial external position W(0) because we are 
looking at the ratio relative to current GDP.  At much later time , the initial value only 
contributes W(0)/y(t) to our estimate of W(t)/y(t).  As y(t) grows, this ratio declines to 
zero.  Variable ht = net debt/GDP = -W(t)/y(t),is  the negative of the net external 
assets/GDP.  The ht = debt/GDP and debt/net worth ft are related positively according to 
equation (25). 
 
6. Application of stochastic optimal control to controversies and questions 
Three empirical series are required to apply our theoretical analysis to evaluate the 
arguments of the Pessimists and Optimists and to answer Bernanke's questions.  They are 
the risk adjusted net return for the US in the partial equilibrium analysis ([A][B]/Box 2), 
the risk adjusted differential return (b1-b2)/R in the general equilibrium analysis ([C]/BOX 
2) and ht the debt/GDP ratio. 
 
6.1.  General Equilibrium 
The optimal debt/GDP ratio for the US should be proportional to the difference in 
growth rates.  Table 1 contains the means and standard deviations of the growth rates in 
the US, the Euro Area and Japan, annual data over the period 1991-2004.  Figure 7 plots 
                                                 
36 In measuring the rate of inflation, Central Banks have found it desirable to separate the volatile prices of 
food and fuel from the prices of the other commodities and derive a measure of the "core" rate of inflation.  
We do a similar thing for net foreign assets or net foreign debt.    J.L. Stein, US Current Account Deficits: A Stochastic Optimal Control Analysis  38
the difference in growth rates between the US and the Euro Area (USEUGROW) and the 
difference between the US and Japanese growth rates (USJPNGROW) for each year.  It is 
evident that almost always the return on capital has been higher in the US
37.  Moreover, 
the risk adjusted growth rate z, measured in table 1/row 3 as the ratio of the mean/standard 
deviation, is very much higher in the US than it is in either the Euro Area or Japan.  For 
example, if the index of US risk adjusted return z1 = 100, the risk- adjusted rate of return 
in Japan z2 = 45 and in the Euro area z3 =74.  Therefore the optimal debt/net worth ratio 
f(z1;γ) for the US should be positive and negative for Japan and the Euro area.
38.  There is 
nothing paradoxical that: (i) the US should be debtor and that Japan should be a creditor 
and (ii) the US has current account deficits
39 and Japan and the Euro area have current 
account surpluses.   
                                                 
37 Over the period 1980-2004, the US switched from a creditor to a debtor country, and the Asia-Pacific 
Industrial countries, particularly Japan switched from debtors to creditors. See International Monetary Fund, 
WEO, April 2005, chapter III, page 112. 
38 The IMF (WEO, Sept. 2005, pp. 100-01) estimated internal rates of return on invested capital over the 
period 1994-2003.  They estimated that it was 8.6% for the US, and in emerging Asia -4.6%.  Hence even 
on that basis, the US should be a debtor country. 
39 See also figure 1 for the time path of the US current account/GDP.  J.L. Stein, US Current Account Deficits: A Stochastic Optimal Control Analysis  39
 
Figure 7. Difference between US growth rate and Japanese growth rate USJPNGROW 











Figure 7. Difference between US and Japan (USJPNGROW), and between US and Euro 
(USEUROGROW), growth rates. 
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   Table  1 
Growth rates of real GDP, 1991-2004 annual; Current account/GDP, in US, Euro area and 
Japan 
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 1.59   
Index of 
z 
100    45   74  
Sources: Growth rates: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, OECD.  The return on capital b 
= g/j, where g is the growth rate and j is the investment ratio.  The latter is relatively 
similar at 20% of GDP; Current account/GDP, International Monetary Fund, WEO Sept. 
2005, table 1.5 page 20. 
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6.2. Evaluation of arguments of Optimists and Pessimists 
Since1998 when the current account deficit was 2.4% of GDP there have been 
concerns about the effects upon the real value of the US dollar.  Subsequently, the ratio of 
current account deficit/GDP and the core debt/GDP ratio have increased significantly 
without any downward trend in the real value of the US dollar
40.  The Pessimists base 
their fears upon an arbitrary number for the debt ratio in equation (1), equal to A/g the 
ratio of the capitalized value of the current account deficit/GDP, where the capitalization 
factor is the growth rate.  They freely admit that they cannot justify what number should 
set off Warning Signals that the US external net debt is a clear and present danger.  They 
lack a quantitatively useful theoretical framework of analysis. 
Moreover, the Pessimists have not refuted the views of the Optimists.  The 
external debt is a menace insofar as there is a significant debt burden.  The latter is 
defined as the ratio of net investment payments/GDP.  Net investment payments include 
interest, dividends, reinvested earnings and compensation of affiliates.  Although the core 
debt/GDP has been growing rapidly, the balance on investment income has not been 
significantly negative
41.  Figure 1 shows that the debt burden has been a trivial fraction of 
GDP.  It is the distance between the trade balance/GDP (BOPBGSGDP) and current 
account/GDP (NETFIGDP).  Since there has hardly been a debt burden during the period 
when the core external debt has been rising rapidly, consumption (equation 3.1) will not 
be significantly adversely affected by the stochastic variables: the return on capital and the 
effective real rate of interest. 
Both the Optimists and the Pessimists must ask why the debt has been rising: is it 
due to a decline in the saving rate or due to a rise in the productivity of capital?  In terms 
of our analysis, the debt/net worth ratio should be analyzed as follows.  The optimal ratio 
of capital/net worth k = 1 + f, where f is the optimal debt ratio.  Figure 3 describes the 
situation.  If the debt ratio has been rising to finance consumption or non-productive 
investment, then the debt ratio has been rising above the optimal line.  The debt has been 
rising without a corresponding increase in net worth X = K - L, capital less debt.  This 
would be a movement towards Q in figure 3.  Consumption becomes more vulnerable to 
                                                 
40 See figure 2 for the real exchange rate  and current account. 
41 See Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, FRED, category "Balance on investment income" BOPBII.  The 
data ultimately derive from US Department of Commerce, Bureau if Economic Analysis.  J.L. Stein, US Current Account Deficits: A Stochastic Optimal Control Analysis  42
shocks, as shown in figure 5.  If the debt has been rising to finance productive capital 
formation then debt ratio will not be above the curve.   
What are the expected consequences for the real value of the dollar?  The 
Optimists focus upon the capital inflow, equal to investment less saving.  It is not 
convincing to argue that, since investment less saving is positive in the US and negative in 
the rest of the world, there is an optimal demand for capital inflows and that the current 
account deficit is not a source of concern.  Low saving rates in the US - attributed to the 
behavior of households and government - relative to those in the creditor countries has led 
to capital inflows.  These inflows have very different effects upon the real exchange rate 
in the medium and in the long term
42.  In the medium run, the capital inflows appreciate 
the real exchange rate.  However, insofar as the capital inflows are financing consumption 
- are due to low saving ratios - the debt ratio is rising steadily.  In the longer run, the real 
exchange rate will depreciate to generate a trade balance sufficient to make the interest 
payments on the growing and high value of the debt.  The Optimists neglect to look at the 
where the debt is heading and the effects upon the long run real value of the dollar.   
The scenario that must underlie the Optimists' position is that the return on capital 
has been higher in the US than in the rest of the world.  Then the capital inflow finances 
capital formation.  The real exchange rate appreciates and the debt rises in the medium 
term.  The greater capital increases the productive capacity of the economy, and makes it 
more competitive.  At any real exchange rate, the trade balance rises.  As a result in the 
longer run, the real exchange rate appreciates further and the debt declines.  In this case, 
the rise in current account deficit and hence in the debt in the medium run is not a source 
of concern. 
A crucial question is whether the debt ratio is heading into the region of an excess 
debt: the region above optimal line in figure 3?  The analysis, summarized in BOX 2, 
explains why the Pessimists' position can be justified on the basis of trends, and not upon 
current levels, of the debt ratio.  Regardless of the stochastic process, the optimal debt 
ratio should follow the appropriate risk adjusted return.  The risk adjusted return z is a net 
return divided by the risk, as described in the cases [A][B] in BOX 2, depending upon the 
                                                 
42 See the analysis of the fundamental determinants of the real exchange rate in the NATREX model, Stein 
(2006, chapter 4).   J.L. Stein, US Current Account Deficits: A Stochastic Optimal Control Analysis  43
stochastic process.  The optimal debt ratio
43 f(z;γ) = z/(1-γ) depends upon both z and risk 
aversion (1-γ).  We have measured the risk adjusted net return z but one cannot 
objectively measure (1-γ) > 0 risk aversion.  In terms of figure 3, we know the point on the 
abscissa z, but we do not know the slope of the line, which is the reciprocal of risk 
aversion.  The lower is the risk aversion, the greater is the slope of the line, and the larger 
is the optimal debt ratio for any value of z.  This is true for all cases in BOX 2.   
If the Prototype Model [A] is valid then the optimal debt/net worth ratio Lt/Xt = 
f(z;γ) depends upon z the mean net return / risk.  These are presented in the histogram and 
statistics in figure 6.  The intercept term f(0) = -0.32 is not significantly different from 
zero.  The estimate of f(z;γ) is equation (27).   
The optimal debt/net worth depends upon the slope of the line in figure 3, which is 
1/(1-γ), as well as upon the point on the abscissa (b-r)/σ
2, the risk adjusted net return.   
(27) f* = optimal debt/net worth = mean NETRETURN1/(1-γ)variance  
       f* = optimal debt/net worth = 0.175/(1-γ)(0.148)
2 = 7.9/(1-γ) 
Graphically, the optimal ratio of debt/net worth in the case above is given by a 
rectangular hyperbola f*(1-γ) = 7.9.  The higher the risk aversion, the lower is the optimal 
debt/net worth ratio.  Any choice of risk aversion is arbitrary, because it is based upon an 
arbitrary utility function.  If risk aversion is unity, then h* = optimal debt/GDP is equation 
(28).  It is derived from equations (27) and (25).  The value of b is the output/GDP ratio 
which is b = 0.23.   
(28) h* = optimal debt/GDP = f /b(1+f) = (7.9/8.9) / (0.23) = 3.8 
In 2004q2 the ratio of net core debt/GDP was 1.32.  Hence, the level of the actual 
debt ratio is not excessive, based upon risk aversion of unity and the Prototype Model.  In 
this case, the position of the Optimists is supported in terms of the level of the debt ratio.   
Associated with this estimate of an optimal debt ratio is a ratio of the optimal 
current account deficit/GDP denoted by A , which is equal to the product of the growth 
rate and optimal debt ratio.  With a growth rate of .04 per annum, the associated optimal 
current account deficit is A = gh = (0.04)(3.8) = 15% of GDP.  The fact that the current 
                                                 
43 The optimal debt/net worth ratio is f = z/(1-γ) + f(0).  The intercept term f(0) is the optimal debt ratio 
when the net return z = 0.  Empirically, f(0) is very close to zero and is therefore ignored.  See Stein (2006, 
ch. 9) for details.  J.L. Stein, US Current Account Deficits: A Stochastic Optimal Control Analysis  44
account deficit in year 2006 is about 6% is not a cause for alarm, because the debt ratio of 
1.32 is less than the estimate 3.8 of the optimal debt/GDP ratio.  The greater is risk 
aversion, the lower is the value of z/(1-γ), and hence the lower is the optimal debt ratio.  
Because risk aversion is a subjective variable, it is difficult to justify what is the optimal 
debt ratio.  We avoid the insuperable problem of specifying risk aversion (1-γ) by 
assuming that it is constant  
If the stochastic process is Ergodic Mean Reversion, case [B] in BOX 2, then the 
optimal debt/net worth ratio must follow the current return bt, not b the mean return in the 
partial equilibrium analysis.  This is also true in the general equilibrium analysis case [C].  
Figure 8 graphs NETDEBTGDP the core net debt/GDP and two estimates of (bt - rt) the 
net return.  In NETRETURN1, the measure of the real interest rate r = i, which is just real 
interest rate.  This is relevant when the US debt is denominated in US dollars, and the US 
bears no exchange risk.  The GAINFX1= bt - rt where rt = it + dNt/Nt, is the sum of the real 
interest rate and the depreciation of the US dollar.  This is relevant if the US bears the 
exchange risk.    J.L. Stein, US Current Account Deficits: A Stochastic Optimal Control Analysis  45
 













Figure 8 Net return = (bt - rt)  =NETRETURN1; GAINFX1, Core value of the US net 
debt/GDP = NETDEBTGDP.  The NETRETURN1 statistics are in figure 6.  Mean core 
debt ratio = 0.456, standard deviation = 0.368. 
 
If risk aversion is relatively constant, then the debt ratio ht = NETDEBTGDP 
should follow the net return.  Figure 8 shows that this is not the case.  The debt ratio has 
been rising significantly since 1982, but neither partial equilibrium measure of the net 
return has been rising.  Regardless of which case is relevant in BOX 2 - partial/ general 
equilibrium, Prototype Model / Ergodic Mean Reversion Model - the trends of the debt 
support the Pessimists' position.  However, current the level of the debt ratio is not 
excessive.  J.L. Stein, US Current Account Deficits: A Stochastic Optimal Control Analysis  46
7. Conclusions 
The "Pessimists" and the "Optimists" disagree whether the United States external 
deficits and the associated buildup of net foreign liabilities are problems that require 
urgent attention.  Neither side provides a theoretically based empirical measure of what 
should be an early warning signal (EWS) of impending difficulties.  Our contribution is 
the use of Stochastic Optimal Control/Dynamic Programming (SOC/DP) to derive an 
inter-temporal optimal debt ratio, and then show how it can be implemented empirically.  
The optimal debt ratio or debt burden should take into account the vulnerability of 
consumption to shocks from the productivity of capital, the interest rate and exchange 
rate.  The reason for using SOC/DP is that the shocks are unpredictable, and it is essential 
to have a feedback control mechanism.  The derived optimal ratio depends upon the 
measurable risk adjusted net return and risk aversion both at home and abroad.  An EWS 
is that the debt ratio deviates significantly from the optimal ratio.  On the basis of 
alternative estimates, we conclude that: (i) The Optimists are correct that the current debt 
ratio is not a menace, because the current level of the debt ratio is not above the 
corresponding level of the optimum. (ii) The Pessimists fears are justified on the basis of 
trends.  The trend of the actual debt ratio is higher than that of the optimal ratio.    J.L. Stein, US Current Account Deficits: A Stochastic Optimal Control Analysis  47
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